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Savenda Management Services Limited v Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited and Gregory Chifire 
Selected Judgment No. 47 of 2018 
Elliot Mfune1 
The Facts 
This case emanated from the Savenda Management Services Limited v Stanbic Bank Zambia 
Limited2 in which Savenda took out an action in the High Court against the Bank claiming, 
amongst other things, general damages for negligence arising from the unlawful referral of the 
credit details of Savenda to the credit reference agency. 
Dissatisfied with the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Savenda case, Chifire was on the 23rd June 
2018, reported as labelling the Chief Justice ‘the most corrupt judge’. Chifire went on to allege 
that monies were paid to the Supreme Court judges and also judges of the Court of Appeal in 
order to procure the judgment in favour of the Bank. In addition, the Mast an online publication 
on 15th June 2018 attributed another statement to the Chifire stating that he was persuaded 
beyond any shadow of doubt that justice was not properly dispensed with in the Savenda matter 
and if the matter was left unresolved, it would help in the creation of bad law. Finally, in July 
2018, Chifire gave a telephone interview to The Mast where he was quoted as alleging that: 
‘the judgment is bad law; and impropriety on the part of members of the judiciary.’  
Holding 
The court found the actions of Chifire to be contemptuous in nature as they were deemed to 
have scandalised the court, thereby impeding the court’s role of administration of justice. This 
commentary argues, however, that whilst justice might well have been done in the case in 
question, it was unquestionably not seen to be done. This is owing to three principal reasons.  
First, the learned judges appeared to have acted both as prosecutors and adjudicators in their 
own cause when it was not urgent or practically necessary to act immediately on their own 
motion. Second, the classification by the court of the contempt in question as civil contempt as 
opposed to criminal contempt is foreign to the common law and other jurisdictions. The third 
reason speaks to the shocking sentence handed down by the Court which, in the opinion of this 
commentary, is overly excessive and unwarranted in a democratic country like Zambia.  
 
Significance of the Judgement  
The case is significant in that it raises the question whether Zambian judges have virtually 
unbridled power to move on their own motion to punish for contempt of court any person who 
criticises their judgements. In addition, the case reinforces the traditional struggles associated 
with distinguishing civil from criminal contempt, the consequences of which are entirely based 
on the distinction. The case is also important as it exposes inadequate sentencing guidelines in 
Zambian contempt laws, the effect of which has led to excessive and unwarranted sentences. 
A six-year-old custodial sentence for scandalizing the court by the Supreme Court in this case 
was both excessive and unnecessary, albeit the Court’s wide jurisdiction. 
The law of contempt of court relates to the intentional violation of the dignity, repute and 
authority of the court. Contempt laws provide a device for preventing interference of justice 
and maintain the authority of the law.3 Scandalizing the court, an offence which throughout its 
history has arisen when free comment about judges has become too free for the taste of the 
bench generally falls within the ambit of contempt of court. As Malila aptly put it, scandalizing 
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the court constitutes a sui generis (i.e., unique) offence and does not form part of the ordinary 
criminal law.4 
The offence of scandalizing the court consists of publishing, in writing or verbally, allegations 
which, objectively, tend to bring judges, magistrates or the courts generally into contempt, or 
unjustly to cast suspicion on the administration of justice.5 The offence of scandalizing the 
court invariably creates an inherent tension between two fundamental objectives - protection 
of individuals’ right to freedom of expression on the one hand, and on the other, the need to 
preserve the independency and integrity of the judiciary.6  
The Supreme Court in Savenda rightly held that the contemnor’s freedom of speech must be 
weighed against the need for the preservation of the proper administration of justice.7 In the 
same vein, the Supreme Court in Daniel Mwale v Njolomole Mtonga and Another held that the 
offence of scandalizing the court permissibly derogates from freedom of expression guaranteed 
under the Zambian Constitution.8 Article 20(3)(b) of the Constitution allows laws that derogate 
from freedom of expression when such laws become necessary to maintain the authority and 
independence of the courts.9 
Given his actions, Chifire did in fact scandalise and impugn the integrity of the court, thereby 
impeding the court’s role of administering justice. Notwithstanding the fact that justice might 
well have been done in the case, it certainly did not seem to be done. In the case of R v Sussex 
Justices Ex parte Macarthy,10 Lord Chief Justice Hewart in his judgment stated that ‘It is not 
merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance, that justice should not only be 
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’ Although not a legal 
principle, the foregoing aphorism sustain an ethical requirement that judges and decision-
makers more widely cannot hear a case if, from the perspective of a reasonable and informed 
observer, their impartiality might reasonably appear to be compromised.    
Order 52 rule 1 (22) and (23) of the White Book provides for inherent power of the court to 
punish for contempt.11 This notwithstanding, a court should not act on its own motion when it 
is neither urgent nor imperative to do so. Where the foregoing is the case, the proper practice 
under the White Book is to allow the Attorney General or the Crown Prosecution Service to 
institute proceedings against the alleged contemnor before an independent court. In Zambia, 
such mandate is in the preserve of the National Prosecution Authority. 
It follows from the foregoing that the court can only resort to summary procedure and overlook 
traditional safeguards of criminal proceedings when there is an ‘urgent and practical necessity’ 
to do so.12 The justification for this assertion is that the court should not appear to act both as 
prosecutor and judge as this contravenes the long established principles of natural justice, 
particularly Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa which means ‘No one should be made a 
judge in his own cause.’   
The twin principles of natural justice - the right to be heard on the one hand, and not to be a 
judge in one’s own cause or the rule against bias, on the other, are essentially procedural safety 
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devices upon which the delivery of a sound and just decision is securely preserved and founded. 
The case of Bob Zinka v Attorney General13 is pertinent in this regard. In the case, the Supreme 
Court stated that ‘the principles of natural justice – an English law legacy – are implicit in the 
concept of fair adjudication.’  
From the preceding case, it goes without saying that this rule should be applied very strictly to 
any appearance of possible bias, even if there is actually none. As stated by Lord Denning in 
the Case of Balough v The Crown,14 the power to summarily deal with matters of contempt of 
courts had to be restricted to instances of an exceptional nature when it was ‘urgent and 
imperative to act immediately so as to maintain the authority of the court to prevent 
disorder….’ 
In light of the foregoing, this commentary argues, respectfully, that although justice might have 
well been done in the case, it was not seen to be done as the court appeared to act as both the 
judge and prosecutor, thereby going against the nemo judex in causa sua principle. It was the 
court who identified the grounds of complaint, selected the witnesses (one of the Witnesses 
was a Supreme Court Justice), investigated what the witnesses had to say, decided on the guilt 
or otherwise of the accused and imposed the custodial sentence. 
In addition, this commentary respectfully advances that it was neither urgent nor imperative 
for the court to have summarily handled the case before it. If the court felt there was need to 
urgently move on its own motion due to the seriousness of the offence, it would have done so 
when the first contemptuous act was committed.  
The other issue of concern in the case is the Supreme Court’s classification of the contempt in 
question as ‘contempt, with a criminal element to it as the sanction could be a custodial.’ This 
commentary argues that such classification is alien to the common law. In the contempt 
proceedings against the United Mine Workers, judge Goldbrorugh stated to the defence counsel 
that ‘if you know the exact difference between a civil and criminal contempt, you are the only 
one who does.’ Judge Goldsborough might well have been right in denying that there is any 
‘exact difference’ insofar as the distinction between these two kinds of contempt as they consist 
of a multitude of differences. This lack of clear classification, according to Moskovitz, arises 
in most instances because ‘any given distinction between civil and criminal contempt maybe 
treated in one case as a basis of the classification, and in another as a consequence of the 
classification.’15 
Granted the difficulty in distinguishing civil from criminal contempt, Oswald contends that: 
Contempts which tend to bring the administration of justice into scorn, or which tend 
to interfere with the due course of justice, are criminal in their nature; but that 
contempt in disregarding orders or judgements or a civil suit, or in doing something 
ordered to be done in a cause, is not criminal in its nature.16 
In the same vein, Malila in his article defines criminal contempt as consisting of words or acts 
obstructing or tending to obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice.17 
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Comparatively, section 4 of the Kenyan Contempt of Court Act 2016, a replica of the English 
Contempt of Court Act 1981,18 distinguishes civil and criminal contempt as: 
Civil contempt is the wilful disobedience of any judgement decree direction, order 
or any other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court 
and criminal contempt as publication whether by words, spoken or written or the 
doing of any act which scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers judicial authority, 
prejudices or tends to interfere with due course of any judicial proceedings or 
interferes or tends to interfere with administration of justice.19 
The foregoing reinforces the common law distinction of civil and criminal contempt. The 
Supreme Courts holding that every kind of contempt outside the ambit of the Penal Code is 
civil in nature is alien to common law and other jurisdictions. Given the lack of definition of 
civil contempt, the Court ought to have referred to the White Book or common law for 
clarification. Instead, the court opted to ignore the distinction as provided in the White Book, 
but referred to it in sentencing, citing lacunas in legislation. This commentary argues that the 
actions of chifire were criminal in nature as he scandalised the court. The charges brought to 
him are unique to criminal law. 
With respect to the sentence imposed on the contemnor, it appeared that the Supreme Court 
intended to send a message to both would-be contemnors and counsel taking on such cases. A 
six-year sentence imposed on the contemnor and suspension of counsel from the bar is 
problematic as it goes against the principal object of punishing for contempt. 
To buttress this point, the case of R v The Commissioner of Police20 highlights the principal 
purpose of the instituting contempt proceedings against contemnors. The view of the court can 
be noted from the words of Lord Denning when he stated as follows: 
Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as means to uphold our 
own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to supress those 
who speak against us. We do not fear criticism nor do we resent it. For there is 
something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech 
itself……… 
The import of the preceding case is that contempt proceedings are to be utilised purely as means 
of preserving the administration of justice and not as means of supressing individuals who 
criticise the court. Similarly, Justice Black of the United States Supreme Court was expressing 
a truism not restricted to his own country when he pointed out that:  
the assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from 
published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For 
it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with 
perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however 
limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably 
engender resentment, suspicion and contempt, much more than it would enhance 
respect.21 
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The above has been cited by various Indian scholars and justices that advocate for a liberal 
approach when dealing with contempt of court proceedings.22 As observed in the case of In the 
Matter of Article 143, Constitution of India:23 
Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to 
sustain the dignity or status of the Court, but may sometimes affect it adversely. 
Wise judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their 
office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, 
the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of approach, and by the restraint, dignity 
and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct. 
The above cases highlight the fact the courts must employ a fair, fearless and objective 
approach in delivering judgements in order to attain and maintain the dignity that they seek 
through the law of contempt of court. That said, it goes without saying that passing harsh 
sentences and instilling fear in the legal fraternity and the public at large will only cause 
resentment, suspicion and will not enhance the very respect that they seek.   
This case presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to undertake a liberal approach 
when dealing with issues of contempt of court and human rights. It was an opportunity to break 
ground for a new jurisprudence that enunciates for judicial activism in favour of human rights. 
Instead, the decision only showed the lack of tolerance by Superior Courts with regard to 
freedom of expression. In addition, this decision is a clarion call to the legislature to intervene 
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